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Abstract
The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey’s The-
sis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally
required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey’s Thesis
has emerged (Hedden, 2013; Wron´ski & Godziszewski, 2017; Wron´ski,
2018)—I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this ob-
jection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that deter-
mines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often
disagrees with Ramsey’s Thesis. I suggest two responses to Hedden’s
objection. First, we might be permissive: agents are permitted to pay
any price that is required or permitted by RT, and they are permitted
to pay any price that is required or permitted by MSEU. This allows
us to give a revised version of the Dutch Book Argument for Prob-
abilism, which I call the Permissive Dutch Book Argument. Second,
I suggest that even the proponent of the Expected Utility Objection
should admit that RT gives the correct answer in certain very limited
cases, and I show that, together with MSEU, this very restricted ver-
sion of RT gives a new pragmatic argument for Probabilism, which I
call the Bookless Pragmatic Argument.
Aarav believes the Eiffel Tower is over 200m tall more strongly than he
believes that it is over 100m tall. Cina´ed is 60% confident that it will rain
tomorrow and 20% confident it will not. Intuitively, Aarav and Cina´ed are
irrational. You are irrational if you believe one proposition more strongly
than another it entails; and you are irrational if you believe a proposition
and its negation to degrees that sum to less than 100%. Both of these credal
principles follow from the more general principle of Probabilism, which
says that your credences should obey the axioms of the probability calcu-
lus. We specify Probabilism more precisely in Section 1 below.
∗Acknowledgements: I am very grateful to Brian Hedden, Leszek Wron´ski, and Michał
Tomasz Godziszewski for extremely helpful feedback on an earlier version of this paper.
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The two most popular arguments for Probabilism are the Dutch Book
Argument—originally due to Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1937) and bol-
stered by Kemeny (1955) and Shimony (1955)—and the Accuracy Domi-
nance Argument—originally due to Rosenkrantz (1981) and Joyce (1998)
and bolstered by Predd et al. (2009) and Pettigrew (2016). The Accuracy
Dominance Argument begins from the observation that one of the roles
our credences should play is to represent the world—this is their epistemic
role. They are thus better or worse depending on how well they repre-
sent the world. The Accuracy Dominance Argument then purports to show
that credences that do not satisfy Probabilism play this role suboptimally—
there will be alternative credences that are guaranteed to represent the
world better. The Dutch Book Argument, on the other hand, begins from
the observation that another of the roles our credences should play is to
guide our actions and help us make good decisions—this is their pragmatic
role. They are thus better or worse depending on the value of the outcomes
of the decisions they lead us to make. The Dutch Book Argument then pur-
ports to show that credences that do not satisfy Probabilism play this role
suboptimally—there will be actions you might face where these credences
will lead you to choose in a way that gets you bad outcomes for sure.
In this paper, we focus on the Dutch Book Argument and a recent sort of
objection to it raised by Hedden (2013) and again by Wron´ski & Godziszewski
(2017) and Wron´ski (2018, Chapter 2)—I call this the expected utility objection.
We specify Probabilism precisely in Section 1. We sketch the Dutch Book
Argument for that norm in Section 2, focussing particularly on the first
premise. Then, in Section 3, we lay out the objection, which targets that
first premise. We respond to the objection in Sections 4 and 5. In Section
4, we show how to tweak the existing Dutch Book Argument to avoid the
expected utility objection; in Section 5, we offer a new style of pragmatic
argument for Probabilism. In Section 6, we conclude. We state a couple of
theorems along the way, and we prove these in the Appendix (Section 7).
1 What is Probabilism?
As I said above, Probabilism says that your credences should obey the ax-
ioms of the probability calculus. In this section, we spell this out more
precisely. Suppose F is the algebra of propositions to which you assign a
credence. Then we let 0 represent the lowest possible credence you can as-
sign, and we let 1 represent the highest possible credence you can assign.
We then represent your credences by your credence function c : F → [0, 1],
where, for each A in F , c(A) is your credence in A.
Probabilism If c : F → [0, 1] is your credence function, then
rationality requires that:
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(P1a) c(⊥) = 0, where ⊥ is a necessarily false proposition;
(P1b) c(>) = 1, where > is a necessarily true proposition;
(P2) c(A∨ B) = c(A) + c(B), for any mutually exclusive A and
B in F .
Now, you might think that we have missed out a condition that is often
stated amongst the axioms of probability, namely, Non-Negativity:
(P0) c(A) ≥ 0, for any A in F .
In fact, we haven’t missed it out, because we have specified that 0 is the
lowest possible credence you can assign, 1 is the highest, and your cre-
dence function therefore takes values at least 0 and at most 1. So (P0) is
automatically satisfied by any credence function; it is not a feature that
some credence functions have and others lack and that we wish to say all
rational credence functions have.
However, this might seem like a cheat. Instead of establishing Non-
Negativity, as some take the Dutch Book Argument to do, we have sim-
ply assumed it in our representation of credences. But I think it must be
this way. Probabilism combines a metaphysical claim with some normative
claims. The metaphysical claim is that there is a lowest possible credence
and a highest possible credence. Having made that metaphysical claim,
Probabilism then makes some normative claims: it says that you should
have that lowest possible credence in necessary falsehoods, the highest pos-
sible credence in necessary truths, and your credence in a disjunction of
two incompatible propositions should be the sum of your credences in the
disjuncts. The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism purports to establish
the normative claims, not the metaphysical claims.
Consider the alternative, where it is possible for you to have negative
credences—that is, credences lower than 0. If that’s the case, those who
endorse Probabilism would no longer want to say that rationality requires
you to have credence 0 in necessary falsehoods—that is, they would aban-
don (P1a). They want to say that rationality requires you to have as low
a credence as you possibly can in a necessary falsehood—there is noth-
ing special about 0 other than that it is how we chosen to represent lowest
possible credence. So either we say that 0 represents the lowest possible
credence you can have, in which case Non-Negativity (i.e. (P0)) holds of
all credence functions and is not a normative claim to be established; or we
say that it is possible for you to have a negative credence, in which case
the proponent of Probabilism will not want to demand that c(⊥) = 0, and
we abandon (P1a). I opt for the first. It is an interesting question what the
rational requirements for credences would be if there were no lowest pos-
sible credence or no highest possible credence. Whatever is the answer, it
won’t be Probabilism.
3
Finally, before we leave this section, let me state an equivalent formu-
lation of Probabilism, which it will be useful to have in mind in Section
5:1
Partition Probabilism If c : F → [0, 1] is your credence func-
tion, then rationality requires that, for any two partitions X =
{X1, . . . , Xm} and Y = {Y1, . . . , Yn},
m
∑
i=1
c(Xi) = 1 =
n
∑
j=1
c(Yj)
2 The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism
The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism has three premises. The first,
which I will call Ramsey’s Thesis and abbreviate RT, posits a connection
between your credence in a proposition and the prices you are rationally
permitted or rationally required to pay for a bet on that proposition. The
second, known as the Dutch Book Theorem, establishes that, if you violate
Probabilism, there is a set of bets you might face, each with a price at-
tached, such that (i) by Ramsey’s Thesis, for each bet, you are rationally
required to pay the attached price for it, but (ii) the sum of the prices of the
bets exceeds the highest possible payout of the bets, so that, having paid
each of those prices, you are guaranteed to lose money. The third premise,
which we might call the Domination Thesis, says that credences are irra-
tional if they mandate you to make a series of decisions (i.e, paying certain
prices for the bets) that is guaranteed to leave you worse off than another
series of decisions (i.e., refusing to pay those prices for the bets)—in the
language of decision theory, paying the attached price for each of the bets
is dominated by refusing each of the bets, and credences that mandate you
to choose dominated options are irrational. The conclusion of the Dutch
Book Argument is then Probabilism. Thus, the argument runs:
The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism
(DBA1) Ramsey’s Thesis
(DBA2) Dutch Book Theorem
(DBA3) Domination Thesis
Therefore,
(DBAC) Probabilism
1A subset X ⊆ F is a partition iff
(i)
∨
X∈X X ≡ > and
(ii) for any X 6= X′ in X , X & X′ ≡ ⊥.
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The argument is valid. The second premise is a mathematical theorem.
Thus, if the argument fails, it must be because the first or third premise is
false, or both. In this paper, we focus on the first premise, and the expected
utility objection to it. So, let’s set out that premise in a little more detail.
In what follows, we assume that (i) you are risk-neutral, and (ii) that
there is some quantity such that your utility is linear in that quantity—
indeed, we will speak as if your utility is linear in money, but that is just for
ease of notation and familiarity; any quantity would do. Neither (i) nor (ii)
is realistic, and indeed these idealisations are the source of other objections
to Ramsey’s Thesis. But they are not our concern here, so we will grant
them.
Ramsey’s Thesis (RT) Suppose your credence in X in c(X).
Consider a bet that pays you £S if X is true and £0 if X is false,
where S is a real number, either positive, negative, or zero—S is
called the stake of the bet. You are offered this bet for the price
£x, where again x is a real number, either positive, negative, or
zero. Then:
(i) If x < c(X) × S, you are rationally required to pay £x to
enter into this bet;
(ii) If x = c(X)× S, you are rationally permitted to pay £x and
rationally permitted to refuse;
(iii) If x > c(X)× S, you are rationally required to refuse.
Roughly speaking, Ramsey’s Thesis says that, the more confident you are in
a proposition, the more you should be prepared to pay for a bet on it. More
precisely, it says: (a) if you have minimal confidence in that proposition
(i.e. 0), then you should be prepared to pay nothing for it; (b) if you have
maximal confidence in it (i.e. 1), then you should be prepared to pay the
full stake for it; (c) for levels of confidence in between, the amount you
should be prepared to pay increases linearly with your credence.
3 The Expected Utility Objection
We turn now to the objection to Ramsey’s Thesis (RT) we wish to treat here.
Hedden begins by pointing out that we have a general theory of how cre-
dences and utilities should guide action:
Given a set of options available to you, expected utility theory
says that your credences license you to choose the option with
the highest expected utility, defined as:
EU(A) =∑
i
P(Oi|A)×U(Oi)
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On this view, we should evaluate which bets your credences
license you to accept by looking at the expected utilities of those
bets. (Hedden, 2013, 485)
He considers the objection that this only applies when credences satisfy
Probabilism, but rejects it:
In general, we should judge actions by taking the sum of the
values of each possible outcome of that action, weighted by
one’s credence that the action will result in that outcome. This
is a very intuitive proposal for how to evaluate actions that
applies even in the context of incoherent credences. (Hedden,
2013, 486)
Thus, Hedden contends that we should always choose by maximising
expected utility relative to our credences, whether or not those credences
are coherent. Let’s call this principle Maximise Subjective Expected Utility
and abbreviate it MSEU. He then observes that MSEU conflicts with RT.
Consider, for instance, Cina´ed from the beginning of the paper. He is 60%
confident it will rain and 20% confident it won’t. According to RT, he is
rationally required to sell for £65 a bet in which he pays out £100 if it rains
and £0 if is doesn’t. But the expected utility of this bet for him is
0.6× (−100+ 65) + 0.2× (−0+ 65) = −8
That is, it has lower expected utility than refusing to sell the bet, since his
expected utility for doing that is
0.6× 0+ 0.2× 0 = 0
So, while RT says you must sell that bet for that price, MSEU says you
must not. So RT and MSEU are incompatible, and Hedden claims that we
should favour MSEU. There are two ways to respond to this. On the first,
we try to retain RT in some form in spite of Hedden’s objection—I call this
the permissive response below. On the second, we try to give a pragmatic
argument for Probabilism using MSEU instead of RT—I call this the bookless
response below. In the following sections, I will consider these in turn.
4 The Permissive Response
While Hedden is right to say that maximising expected utility in line with
Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) is intuitively rational even
when your credences are incoherent, so is Ramsey’s Thesis (RT). It is cer-
tainly intuitively correct that, to quote Hedden, “we should judge actions
by taking the sum of the values of each possible outcome of that action,
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weighted by one’s credence that the action will result in that outcome.”
But it is also intuitively correct that, to quote from our gloss of Ramsey’s
Thesis above, “(a) if you have minimal confidence in that proposition (i.e.
0), then you should be prepared to pay nothing for it; (b) if you have max-
imal confidence in it (i.e. 1), then you should be prepared to pay the full
stake for it; (c) for levels of confidence in between, the amount you should
be prepared to pay increases linearly with your credence.” What are we to
do in the face of this conflict between our intuitions?
One natural response is to say that choosing in line with RT is rationally
permissible and choosing in line with MSEU is also rationally permissible.
When your credences are coherent, the dictates of MSEU and RT are the
same. But when you are incoherent, they are sometimes different, and in
that situation you are allowed to follow either. In particular, faced with a
bet and proposed price, you are permitted to pay that price if it is permitted
by RT and you are permitted to pay it if it is permitted by MSEU.
If this is right, then we can resurrect the Dutch Book Argument with a
permissive version of RT as the first premise:
Permissive Ramsey’s Thesis Suppose your credence in X in
c(X). Consider a bet that pays you £S if X is true and £0 if X is
false. You are offered this bet for the price £x. Then:
(i) If x ≤ c(X)× S, you are rationally permitted to pay £x to
enter into this bet.
And we could then amend the third premise—the Domination Thesis (DBA3)—
to ensure we could still derive our conclusion. Instead of saying that cre-
dences are irrational if they mandate you to make a series of decisions that
is guaranteed to leave you worse off than another series of decisions, we
might say that credences are irrational if they permit you to make a series
of decisions that is guaranteed to leave you worse off than another series
of decisions. In the language of decision theory, instead of saying only that
credences that mandate you to choose dominated options are irrational, we
say also that credences that permit you to choose dominated options are
irrational. We might call this the Permissive Domination Thesis.
Now, by weakening the first premise in this way, we respond to Hed-
den’s objection and make the premise more plausible. But we strengthen
the third premise to compensate and perhaps thereby make it less plausi-
ble. However, I imagine that anyone who accepts one of the versions of
the third premise—either the Domination Thesis or the Permissive Dom-
ination Thesis—will also accept the other. Having credences that mandate
dominated choices may be worse than having credences that permit such
choices, but both seem sufficient for irrationality. Perhaps the former makes
you more irrational than the latter, but it seems clear that the ideally rational
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agent will have credences that do neither. And if that’s the case, then we
can replace the standard Dutch Book Argument with a slight modification:
The Permissive Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism
(PDBA1) Permissive Ramsey’s Thesis
(PDBA2) Dutch Book Theorem
(PDBA3) Permissive Domination Thesis
Therefore,
(PDBAC) Probabilism
In the following three subsections, I wish to offer two considerations in
favour of the permissive version of Ramsey’s Thesis (Sections 4.1 and 4.3)
and one against it (Section 4.2).
4.1 Competing partitions in MSEU
Quite independently of Ramsey’s Thesis, it seems that we might want a
permissive version of MSEU. Consider the following example:
Cina´ed is asked to consider the following two bets:
• Bet 1 £10 if it rains, £0 if it doesn’t.
• Bet 2 £10 if it doesn’t rain, £0 if it does.
He must either pay £4 for Bet 1 or £4 for Bet 2—this is a forced
choice situation. Let R be the proposition that it will rain. The
payoffs are as follows:
R R
Bet 1 6 -4
Bet 2 -4 6
Let W be the proposition that it will be windy. Then suppose
Cina´ed has credences in the following four states of the world:
RW RW RW RW
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
And he has credences in the following two more coarse-grained
propositions:
R R
0.6 0.4
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So his credences are incoherent: his credences in RW and RW
don’t sum to his credence in R; and his credences in RW and
RW don’t sum to his credence in R.
Now, MSEU says that Cina´ed should choose whether to bet on
rain or no rain by calculating which will maximise his expected
utility. But this raises the question: calculated relative to which
partition? The more fine-grained one, namely, RW, RW, RW,
and RW? Or the more coarse-grained one, namely, R, R? It’s
easy to check that, if he calculates relative to the first, he should
choose to pay for Bet 1, since its expected utility (i.e., 2) is higher
than the expected utility of Bet 2 (i.e. 0); but if he calculates
relative to the second, he should choose to pay for Bet 2, since
its expected utility (i.e. 2) is higher than the expected utility of
Bet 1 (i.e. 0).
A natural conclusion to draw from this is that there can’t be any gen-
eral norm that says you should maximise expected utility. As we have just
seen, in certain situations, such a norm leads to incompatible pairs of de-
mands, and rationality surely satisfies an logical ought-can principle—that
is, principles of rationality must never make two demands that, as a matter
of logic, cannot both be fulfilled.
The upshot is that, quite independently of any considerations of Ram-
sey’s Thesis, we have reason to give a permissive reading of MSEU. We
must not take MSEU to say that you are required to choose an option if it
maximises subjective expected utility, for that will give rise to incompati-
ble demands; rather, we must take it to say that you are permitted to choose
such an option. And this makes it more plausible that there might be other
permitted actions besides those that maximise expected utility relative to
some partition—for instance, actions permitted by the permissive version
of Ramsey’s Thesis.
In fact, Hedden considers cases of partition-sensitive decisions—such
as Cina´ed’s forced choose between the bets on rain above—and comes to
a different conclusion (Hedden, 2013, Footnote 17). He concludes that we
should take MSEU to say that you are required to choose an option if it max-
imises expected utility, and he responds to cases in which our credences
lead, via this version of MSEU, to deliver two incompatible verdicts by say-
ing that, in such cases, we should declare the credences irrational, rather
than declaring the norm faulty.
So, while these cases of partition-sensitivity might give us some rea-
son to be permissive about the actions that are rational for someone with
incoherent credences, other responses to these cases are available.
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4.2 An error theory for our RT intuitions
Above, I claimed that, while Hedden is right to say that MSEU is intuitively
correct, RT also has intuitive support—and I asked what to do in the face of
this. One way to argue that we should favour MSEU over RT would then
be to undermine the intuitions in favour of RT.
We might begin by noting cases in which the verdict of MSEU is more
intuitive than the verdict of RT. Thus, for instance, suppose I have credence
0.99 in a proposition and also 0.99 in its negation. Then RT says that I
must pay £98 for a bet that pays me £100 if the proposition is true and
£0 if it is false, while MSEU says that I must pay at most £50 for that bet.
Now, intuition is on the side of MSEU here, I think. It seems irrational to
choose an action that will result in such a large loss (£98) in one situation
and such a small gain (£2) in the other, when you are equally confident in
both situations.
What’s more, it seems that we can give an error theory for our intuitions
in favour of RT. Our intuitions, we might say, are acquired in an environ-
ment in which, while many individuals we encounter are not probabilisti-
cally coherent, they at least tend to become less confident in a proposition
as they become more confident in its negation. Thus, when we find RT in-
tuitively correct, we are giving voice to intuitions that only really apply in
these sorts of situations. As soon as we consider other sorts of situation,
such as the case in which I have credence 0.99 in a proposition and 0.99 in
its negation, the intuitive support for RT evaporates.
I have some sympathy with this line of argument. However, as we will
see in the next subsection, there are also situations in which RT gives what
is clearly the more intuitive recommendation.
4.3 More intuitions in favour of RT
Consider Dima and Esther. They both have minimal confidence—i.e. 0—
that it won’t rain tomorrow. But Dima has credence 0.01 that it will rain,
while Esther has credence 0.99 that it will. If we permit only actions that
maximise expected utility, then Dima and Esther are required to pay exactly
the same prices for bets on rain—that is, Dima will be required to pay a
price exactly when Esther is. After all, if £S is the payoff when it rains, £0 is
the payoff when it doesn’t, and x is a proposed price, then 0.01× (S− x) +
0× (0− x) ≥ 0 iff 0.99× (S− x) + 0× (0− x) ≥ 0 iff S ≥ x. So, according
to MSEU, Dima and Esther are rationally required to pay anything up to
the stake of the bet for such a bet. But this is surely wrong. It is surely at
least permissible for Dima to refuse to pay a price that Esther accepts. It is
surely permissible for Esther to pay £99 for a bet on rain that pays £100 if
it rains and £0 if it doesn’t, while Dima refuses to pay anything more than
£1 for such a bet, in line with Ramsey’s Thesis. Suppose Dima were offered
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such a bet for the price of £99, and suppose she then defended her refusal
to pay that price saying, ‘Well, I only think it’s 1% likely to rain, so I don’t
want to risk such a great loss with so little possible gain when I think the
gain is so unlikely’. Then surely we would accept that as a rational defence.
In response to this, defenders of MSEU might concede that RT is some-
times the correct norm of action when you are incoherent, but only in very
specific cases, namely, those in which you have a positive credence in a
proposition, minimal credence (i.e. 0) in its negation, and you are consid-
ering the price you might pay for a bet on that proposition. In all other
cases—that is, in any case in which your credences in the proposition and
its negation are both positive, or in which you are considering an action
other than a bet on a proposition—you should use MSEU. Again, I have
some sympathy with this, and I will appeal to it when I offer my new prag-
matic argument for Probabilism in Section 5.
Thus, at the end of this section, we have an amended version of the
Dutch Book Argument that is based on the Permissive Ramsey’s Thesis
and the Permissive Domination Thesis—I called this the Permissive Dutch
Book Argument above. In the last three subsections, we have considered
arguments for and against Permissive Ramsey’s Thesis. None of the objec-
tions are decisive, but they are sufficiently worrying that we would surely
prefer to have a more secure foundation for the Dutch Book Argument.
5 The Bookless Response
Suppose you refuse even the permissive version of RT, and insist that co-
herent and incoherent agents alike should choose in line with MSEU. Then
what becomes of the Dutch Book Argument? As we noted above, Hedden
shows that it fails—MSEU is not sufficient to establish the conclusion. In
particular, Hedden gives an example of an incoherent credence function
that is not Dutch Bookable via MSEU. That is, there are no sets of bets with
accompanying prices such that (a) MSEU will demand that you pay each
of those prices, and (b) the sum of those prices is guaranteed to exceed the
sum of the payouts of that set of bets. However, as we will see, accept-
ing individual members of such a set of bets is just one way to make bad
decisions based on your credences.
Consider Hedden’s example. In it, you assign credences to propositions
in the algebra built up from three possible worlds, w1, w2, and w3. Here are
some of your credences:
c(w1 ∨ w2) = 0.8 c(w3) = 0
c(w1) = 0.7 c(w2 ∨ w3) = 0
Now, consider the following two options, A and B, whose utilities in each
state of the world are set out in the following table:
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w1 w2 w3
A 78 77 77
B 74 74 75
Then notice first that A dominates B—that is, the utility of A is higher than
B in every possible state of the world. But, using your incoherent credences,
you assign a higher expected utility to B than to A. Your expected utility for
A—which must be calculated relative to your credences in w1 and w2 ∨w3,
since the utility of A given w1 ∨ w2 is undefined—is 0.7× 78 + 0× 77 =
54.6. And your expected utility for B—which must be calculated relative
to your credences in w1 ∨ w2 and w3, since the utility of B given w2 ∨ w3 is
undefined—is 0.8× 74 + 0× 75 = 59.2. So, while Hedden might be right
that MSEU won’t leave you vulnerable to a Dutch Book, it will leave you
vulnerable to choosing a dominated option. And since what is bad about
entering a Dutch Book is that it is a dominated option—it is dominated by
the option of refusing the bets—the invulnerability to Dutch Books should
be no comfort to you.
Now, this raises the question: For which incoherence credences is it
guaranteed that MSEU won’t lead you to choose a dominated option? Is it
all incoherent credences, in which case we would have a new Dutch Book
Argument for Probabilism from MSEU rather than RT? Or is it some sub-
set? Below, we prove a theorem that answers that. First, a weakened ver-
sion of Probabilism:
Bounded Probabilism If c : F → [0, 1] is your credence func-
tion, then rationality requires that:
(BP1a) c(⊥) = 0, where ⊥ is a necessarily false proposition;
(BP1b) There is 0 < M ≤ 1 such that c(>) = M, where > is a
necessarily true proposition;
(BP2) c(A∨ B) = c(A) + c(B), if A and B are mutually exclusive.
Bounded Probabilism says that you should have lowest possible credence
in necessary falsehoods, some positive credence—not necessarily 1—in nec-
essary truths, and your credence in a disjunction of two incompatible propo-
sitions should be the sum of your credences in the disjuncts.
Theorem 1
c satisfies Bounded Probabilism
⇔
For all options A, B, if A dominates B, then EUc(A) > EUc(B).
The proof is in the Appendix. Thus, even without Ramsey’s Thesis or the
permissive version described above, you can still give a pragmatic argu-
ment for a norm that lies very close to Probabilism, namely, Bounded Prob-
abilism. On its own, this argument cannot say what is wrong with someone
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who gives less than the highest possible credence to necessary truths, but it
does establish the other requirements that Probabilism imposes. To see just
how close to Probabilism lies Bounded Probabilism, consider the following
two norms, which are equivalent to it:
Scaled Probabilism If c : F → [0, 1] is your credence func-
tion, then rationality requires that there is 0 < M ≤ 1 and a
probability function p : F → [0, 1] such that c(−) = M× p(−).
Bounded Partition Probabilism If c : F → [0, 1] is your cre-
dence function, then rationality requires that, for any two parti-
tions X = {X1, . . . , Xm} and Y = {Y1, . . . , Yn},
m
∑
i=1
c(Xi) =
n
∑
j=1
c(Yj)
Then
Lemma 2 The following are equivalent:
(i) Bounded Probabilism
(ii) Scaled Probabilism
(iii) Bounded Partition Probabilism
As before, the proof is in the Appendix.
So, on its own, MSEU can deliver us very close to Probabilism. But it
cannot establish (P1b), namely, c(>) = 1. However, I think we can appeal
to an insight from above to secure (P1b) and push us all the way to Proba-
bilism. Recall our example of Dima and Esther from Section 4.3. At the end,
we concluded that, even if the proponent of MSEU is not moved to permit
also the actions recommended by RT in general, they should concede that
RT gives the correct answers in a very specific sort of case, namely, one
in which you have a positive credence in a proposition, the lowest possible
credence (i.e. 0) in its negation, and you are considering a bet on that propo-
sition. But of course it is precisely by applying Ramsey’s Thesis to such a
case that we can produce a Dutch Book against someone with c(⊥) = 0
and c(>) < 1—we simply offer to pay them £c(>)× 100 for a bet in which
they will pay out £100 if> is true and £0 if it is false; this is then guaranteed
to lose them £100× (1− c(X)), which is positive. Thus, we end up with a
disjunctive pragmatic argument for Probabilism: if c(⊥) = 0 and c(>) < 1,
then RT applies and we can produce a Dutch Book against you; if you vi-
olate Probabilism in any other way, then you violate Bounded Probabilism
and we can then produce two options A and B such that A dominates B,
but your credences, via MSEU, dictate that you should choose B over A.
This, then, is our bookless pragmatic argument for Probabilism:
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Bookless Pragmatic Argument for Probabilism
(BPA1) If c violates Probabilism, then either (i) c(⊥) = 0 and c(>) <
1, or (ii) c violates Bounded Probabilism.
(BPA2) If c(⊥) = 0 and c(>) < 1, then RT applies, and there
is a bet on > such that you are required by RT to pay a
higher price for that bet than its guaranteed payoff. Thus,
there are options A and B (namely, refuse the bets and pay
the price), such that A dominates B, but RT demands that
you choose B over A.
(BPA3) If c violates Bounded Probabilism, then by Theorem 1, there
are options A and B such that A dominates B, but RT de-
mands that you choose B over A.
Therefore, by (BPA1), (BPA2), and (BPA3),
(BPA4) If c violates Probabilism, then there are options A and B
such that A dominates B, but rationality requires you to
choose B over A.
(BPA5) Dominance Thesis
Therefore,
(BPAC) Probabilism
6 Conclusion
The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey’s Thesis, which
determines the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Hed-
den argues that Ramsey’s Thesis is wrong. He claims that Maximise Sub-
jective Expected Utility determines those prices, and it often disagrees with
RT. In Section 4, I suggested that, in the face of that disagreement, we might
be permissive: agents are permitted to pay any price that is required or
permitted by RT and they are permitted to pay any price that is required or
permitted by MSEU. This allows us to give a revised version of the Dutch
Book Argument for Probabilism, namely, the Permissive Dutch Book Ar-
gument. In Section 5, I then explored what we might do if we reject this
permissive response and insist that only prices permitted or required by
MSEU are permissible. I showed that, in that case, we can give a pragmatic
argument for Bounded Probabilism, which comes close to Probabilism, but
doesn’t quite reach; and I showed that, if we allow RT in the very particular
cases in which it agrees better with intuition than MSEU does, we can give
a pragmatic argument for Probabilism, namely, the Bookless Pragmatic Ar-
gument.
14
7 Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1
Lemma 2 The following are equivalent:
(i) Bounded Probabilism
(ii) Scaled Probabilism
(iii) Bounded Partition Probabilism
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose c satisfies Bounded Probabilism. Then consider the
credence function 1M × c(−). We show that it is a probability function:
(P1a) 1M × c(⊥) = 1M × 0 = 0.
(P1b) 1M × c(>) = 1M ×m = 1.
(P2) 1M × c(A ∨ B) = 1M × (c(A) + c(B)) = 1M c(A) + 1M c(B).
So c(−) = M × ( 1M × c(−)), and 1M × c(−) is a probability function, so c
satisfies Scaled Probabilism.
(ii)⇒ (iii). Suppose c satisfies Scaled Probabilism. Then c(−) = M× p(−),
for some 0 < M ≤ 1 and some probability function p. Now, we know from
the equivalence of Probabilism and Partition Probabilism that, for any two
partitions, X and Y ,
m
∑
i=1
p(Xi) = 1 =
n
∑
j=1
p(Yj)
Thus,
m
∑
i=1
c(Xi) =
m
∑
i=1
Mp(Xi) = M
m
∑
i=1
p(Xi) = M = M
n
∑
j=1
p(Yj) =
n
∑
j=1
Mp(Yj) =
n
∑
j=1
c(Yj)
So c satisfies Bounded Partition Probabilism.
(iii) ⇒ (i). Suppose c satisfies Bounded Partition Probabilism. Then we
show that c is a bounded probability function:
(BP1a) Consider the two partitions {>} and {⊥,>}. By Bounded Partition
Probabilism, c(>) = c(⊥) + c(>). So c(⊥) = 0.
(BP1b) Consider the partition {>}. By Bounded Partition Probabilism, c(>) =
M.
(BP2) Consider the two partitions {A, B, A ∨ B} and {A ∨ B, A ∨ B}. Then,
by Bounded Partition Probabilism,
c(A) + c(B) + c(A ∨ B) = M = c(A ∨ B) + c(A ∨ B)
So c(A) + c(B) = c(A ∨ B).
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Thus, c satisfies Bounded Probabilism.
This completes the proof. 2
Theorem 1
c satisfies Bounded Probabilism
⇔
For all options A, B, if A dominates B, then EUc(A) > EUc(B).
Proof of Theorem 1.
(⇒) Suppose c satisfies Bounded Probabilism. Then, by Lemma 2, there is
0 < M ≤ 1 and a probability function p such that c(−) = M× p(−). Now
suppose A and B are actions. Then
• EUc(A) = EUM×p(A) = M× EUp(A)
• EUc(B) = EUM×p(B) = M× EUp(B)
Thus, EUc(A) > EUc(B) iff EUp(A) > EUp(B). And we know that, if A
dominates B and p is a probability function, then EUp(A) > EUp(B).
(⇐) Suppose c violates Bounded Probabilism. Then there are partitions
X = {X1, . . . , Xm} and Y = {Y1, . . . , Yn} such that
m
∑
i=1
c(Xi) = x < y =
n
∑
j=1
c(Yj)
We will now define two acts A and B such that A dominates B, but EUc(A) <
EUc(B).
• For any Xi in X ,
U(A, Xi) = y− i y− x2(m + 1)
• For any Yj in Y ,
U(B, Yj) = x + j
y− x
2(n + 1)
Then the crucial facts are:
• For any two Xi 6= Xj in X ,
U(A, Xi) 6= U(A, Xj)
• For any two Yi 6= Yj in Y ,
U(B, Yi) 6= U(B, Yj)
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• For any Xi in X and Yj in Y ,
x < U(B, Yj) <
x + y
2
< U(A, Xi) < y
So A dominates B, but
EUc(A) =
m
∑
i=1
c(Xi)U(A, Xi) <
m
∑
i=1
c(Xi)× y = xy
while
EUc(B) =
n
∑
j=1
c(Yi)U(B, Yj) >
n
∑
j=1
c(Yj)× x = yx
So EUc(B) > EUc(A), as required. 2
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